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SUMMARY
Systemic importance of a financial institution is measured as the additional tail loss induced into
the system when the financial institution falls into distress due to its own structural shocks. The
use of a structural approach is a step towards addressing a key concern in systemic risk literature,
“Is the firm impacting the market, or is the market impacting the firm?”
The identification exploits “too-big-to-fail” restrictions which are implicitly imposed when a
dynamic factor model is assumed, and the data reveals “too-interconnected-to-fail”, thereby incor-
porating the two key considerations of systemic importance. Over 21,000 firms listed globally are
modelled jointly as a system.
Even though we use only public data, the model’s output relates to actual bailout events, and
also reflects interactions of firms linked to the same supply chain. In addition, we show how Basel’s
list of global systemically important banks can be interpreted in our framework.
Keywords: systemic importance, systemic risk, simultaneity, factor model, structural identifica-
tion, Basel, big data.
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1 Introduction
The 2008-2011 Global Financial Crisis has inspired researchers to conceptualise and measure sys-
temic risk and systemic importance. Measurement of systemic importance serves the macro-
prudential objective of identifying financial institutions which may impact the global financial
system and the wider economy. Indeed, the area of systemic risk is a growing literature with a
variety of ideas being proposed. In this paper, we are interested in measuring systemic importance
in a conceptually sound fashion on a global scale, in particular for financial institutions.
To establish the notion of systemic importance, the policy definition from the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is adopted, that “The Committee is of the view that global systemic
importance should be measured in terms of the impact that a bank‘s failure can have on the global
financial system and wider economy...”1. In other words, the key question in simple words is, “How
does deterioration of a financial institution impact the global community?”
There are two key strengths in the approach laid out in this paper. First, we exploit structural
analysis to attribute systemic importance to individual firms. In other words, we measure the
impact which a firm would cause to the system, after accounting for the confounding effect of
the system’s impact on the firm, subject to the limitations of the system we consider. The key
systemic risk measures which we reference, SRISK and ∆CoVaR, in our opinion, rely on attribution
mechanisms which are too narrow and inherently difficult to interpret. SRISK conditions the system
on a drop in the stock market, and assesses the capital shortfall which a firm would experience due
to its market beta. The difference in our approach is that we condition on the firm’s own structural
deterioration, instead of a single market stress test scenario, and this is closer to the Basel definition
above. Therefore, the origin of risk is directly attributed to the firm instead of subjecting the said
firm to an external situation and then making the additional argument that the firm must raise its
capital shortfall from the market. In the case of ∆CoVaR, a firm’s systemic risk contribution is
1Extracted from: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Global Systemically Important Banks: Updated
Assessment Methodology and the Higher Loss Absorbency Requirement, July 2013
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defined as the difference between the financial system’s value-at-risk conditional on the firm being
under distress, and the financial system’s value-at-risk conditional on the median state of the firm.
The authors note that ∆CoVaR does not distinguish whether the contribution is causal or due to a
common factor, and provide the example of being “systemic as part of the herd”. In other words, a
firm’s ∆CoVaR might not reflect its own contribution to systemic risk or its own capacity to cause
a crisis. A tiny firm could have large ∆CoVaR simply by being part of a “herd” of firms affected by
a common external factor such as the liquidity environment. As per our understanding, identifying
and drawing conclusions from such situations requires additional non-trivial analysis. The papers
relevant to SRISK include Acharya et al (2010), Brownlees and Engle (2012), and Acharya et al
(2012), while ∆CoVaR is discussed in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011).
Second, we use only public data. Specifically, the global scale of over 21,000 listed firms is
modelled jointly as a single system without relying on private inter-firm data. The literature on
systemic risk can be broadly divided into those employing network structures with private inter-firm
assets and liabilities, and those using public data but relying more heavily on correlation analysis.
The advantage of the former approach is that the risk transmission channels are clearly defined and
is well-suited for small to medium scale analysis of network phenomena. It does, however, require a
reasonable extent of modelling and private inter-firm data which is challenging if not impossible to
put together in a consistent manner on a global scale. Clearly, its applicability to global systemic
risk rankings, which is our focus here, is limited. Examples of studies in this area include Nier
et al (2007), Canedo and Jaramillo (2009), Anand et al (2013), and Duan and Zhang (2013). On
the other hand, the latter approach which uses public data often relies on correlation analysis and
meets with the question of causality – does the institution’s failure cause the crisis, or is the crisis
causing the institution’s failure? Our approach, while relying only on public data, attempts to
impose some structure by incorporating “too-big-to-fail” restrictions and letting the data reveal
“too-interconnected-to-fail”, which are the two key considerations of systemic importance. To
demonstrate robustness, we relate the model’s output to actual bailout events for the subset of US
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banks with readily available data. In addition, we study two cases of supply chains driven by large
US firms and find that our model exhibits the expected dependencies.
Other related papers in the systemic risk literature include Hautsch et al (2014) which considers
systemic risk contribution of an individual firm to be the marginal effect of its individual value-at-
risk on the value-at-risk of the system, Huang et al (2012) which defines the systemic importance of
each bank as its marginal contribution to the hypothetical distress insurance premium of the whole
banking system, and Billio et al (2012) which measures Granger Causality of returns and aggregates
the total outward Granger effects of a financial institution to determine systemic rankings. On
the theoretical side, a popular strand stems from Eisenberg and Noe (2001), which explores the
existence of a post-liquidation equilibrium in a static setting; that is, to show that an initial shock
to a banking network can indeed be resolved through the balance sheets of the banks and there is an
end-state after all defaults have taken place. Gourieroux et al (2012) is one example that provides
an extension and uses it to explore contagion risk. Chen et al (2016) uses a similar framework
but incorporates liquidity contagion as an additional channel. White et al (2015) measures tail
dependence using multivariate regression quantiles and is closely related to ∆CoVaR and SRISK.
Copula-based approaches for measuring tail dependence include Han et al (2016) and Okhrin et al
(2015).
More recently, partial correlations have also been used to measure systemic risk, such as CriSIFI
by Chan-Lau et al (2016)2 and CoRisk by Giudici and Parisi (2016). The use of partial correlations
is attractive because it controls for indirect effects that pass through third parties, appealing to the
notion that each partial correlation pair can be attributed to the bilateral interbank relationship. At
the bilateral level, however, it is difficult to determine which bank is affecting which, and some form
of size is usually incorporated (this is also true for SRISK and ∆CoVaR). Our approach recognises
the importance of size upfront and imposes them as restrictions, and control for commonality
through and within the factors.
2Like SRISK, CriSIFI has been operationalised into a live system and rankings are provided online.
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The Basel approach used by the Financial Stability Board relies on an indicator approach which
uses a variety of asset and liability aggregates, most of which correlate strongly with size. Broadly
speaking, this addresses the concern of “too-big-to-fail” without accounting for “too-interconnected-
to-fail” directly. We will show how Basel’s list can be approximately obtained in our framework by
limiting interconnectedness, amplifying the importance of some countries, and downplaying others.
The key technical contribution of this paper is recognising that the assumption of a factor
model, commonly used in asset pricing, implicitly provides identifying restrictions. An individual
firm moves due to factors as well as its own shock, and at the same time, factors are defined
from individual firms. Endogeneity due to simultaneity is embedded within such a system. A
typical assumption is to treat factors as exogenous, often because each firm’s contribution to the
factor is small, for example, the typical CAPM regression. As a result, each firm’s own shock will
be orthogonal to the factors and often termed an idiosyncratic shock, which is a misnomer as it
contradicts the definition of the factors. On the other hand, as we will show, accounting for the
simultaneity allows the expression of all factors and all firms in terms of the firms’ structural shocks.
Systemic importance can then be assessed by conditioning the system on a firm being shocked to
a distressed state due to its own structural shock.
As alluded to, “too-big-to-fail” restrictions are automatically imposed by value-weighting each
firm during the construction of factors. Precisely, we weight each firm by its total liabilities,
since as a precursor, firms with larger liabilities are more likely to impact other firms’ credit
quality. Although the selection of factors affects the structural identification and may introduce
some subjectivity, it turns out that the results are robust to alternative specifications of factor
construction. At the baseline, we use hierarchical correlation clustering to group countries together
and form 3 factors representing the major global economic regions, while for robustness tests we
randomly assign countries to factors.
To our knowledge, the source of identifying restrictions which we use here, i.e. by resolving the
simultaneity in a factor model, is new and adds to the list of structural identification strategies which
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include timing restrictions, zero restrictions, short and long-run restrictions, sign restrictions, etc.
Notably, our motivation differs from the traditional usages of factor models. In pioneering work,
Sargent and Sims (1977) proposed a “two-index model” and briefly noted the issue of simultaneity
and found that two factors could explain a large variation is US economic data. The setting
established by Geweke (1977) is that most economic time series are driven by a small number
of unobserved (and exogenous) factors, and the challenge pertained to identification of structural
shocks that drove these factors. Here, our setting differs in that the structural shocks are individual
firm level shocks, and the factors, being endogenously constructed from individual firms, respond
to the collective force of the firms’ shocks. Good summaries of the long line of literature on factor
models are readily available in Stock and Watson (2005) as well as in Bai and Wang (2016).
As can be seen, our paper stands out in its structural identification strategy, without needing
to make stronger assumptions than those commonly used in asset pricing models. Consequently,
we can assess systemic importance via inspecting structural causality. Indeed, several of the papers
mentioned earlier use factor models but do not recognise the structural implications. Furthermore,
factor models are suitable, in fact almost inevitable, for dealing with very large datasets which are
necessary to address the question of global systemic importance. A comparison of the key features
vis-a-vis SRISK and ∆CoVaR is presented in Table 1.
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Table 1: Key Features of SRISK, ∆CoVaR and This Paper
SRISK ∆CoVaR This Paper
Conditioning
Event
Severe shock of at least
40% to the equity in-
dex over a period of 6
months.
Firm in distress vs firm
in median state.
Firm being shocked to




Capital shortfall of the
firm under the condi-
tioning event.
Difference in asset VaR
of the system under the
two conditioning events.
Additional tail loss in-
duced into the system
due to the firm.
Scope All listed firms globally. Financial firms from
CRSP / COMPUSTAT.
All listed firms globally.
Implementation For each firm, a bivari-
ate GARCH-DCC com-
prising of the equity in-
dex and the firm.
Quantile regressions
based off a set of state
variables.
All firms modelled
jointly using a dynamic





Co-movement of firm eq-
uity with the equity in-
dex.
Not explicit. Co-movement of credit
quality channelled




2 Factor Models and Simultaneity
In this section, we show how a structural representation of the system can be obtained by assuming
a factor model and addressing the embedded endogeneity due to simultaneity. We begin with the
purely contemporaneous case, and then introduce autoregressive structure.
Assumption 1. Firm dynamics can be described by a factor model:
Rtγ = Ftβ + etD (1)
where Rt is a 1 × p vector of credit risk shocks or changes to probabilities of default (PD)3 of p
firms at time t, Ft is a 1 × r vector of changes of r factors at time t, β is a r × p matrix which
maps the factors changes into firm PD changes, et is a 1× p vector of i.i.d. firm structural shocks,
and D is a p × p diagonal matrix of standard deviations. γ is an invertible matrix with diagonal
entries equal to 1, but may have off-diagonal sparse entries.
In other words, PD changes of the firms are driven firstly by factors, and secondly by inter-firm
interactions over and above the factors. Note that by inverting γ, we have Rt = Ftβγ
−1 + etDγ−1
which bears the familiar form of a typical factor model, except that it is more general here in that
Dγ−1 potentially has off-diagonal entries.
Assumption 2. Factors can be represented as an aggregation of firms:
Ft = RtW (2)
where W is a p× r matrix of weights which maps the firm PD changes into factors.
The above two assumptions are commonly made in finance and economics; we are simply
following them to the logical conclusion. For example, in asset pricing the market index is often
3In this paper, we are primarily interested in credit risk shocks, but the technique laid out here should be under-
stood to be more generally applicable to say, stock returns.
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used as a factor, at the same time it is constructed from the firms. In intuitive terms, we are
choosing factors to represent the system, which is reflected in W , the constituent weights. This
belief provides the restrictions and drives the identification.
With the two assumptions, we can substitute (1) into (2) to obtain:
Ft = etDγ
−1W (I − βγ−1W )−1 =: etA (3)
which identifies the factor changes Ft in terms of structural shocks et. Next, substitute (3) into (1)
to obtain the firm PD changes Rt in terms of structural shocks:
Rt = et(Aβ +D)γ
−1 =: etG (4)
The factors essentially provide the channels through which the structural shocks of firms are
transmitted to all other firms, and it is in this manner that identification is provided. W coalesces
the structural shocks of individual firms into factors, and A is the precise way in which it is done.
The factors transmit the shocks to all other firms by way of β. Equations (3) and (4) express these
externalities or contemporaneous feedback effects between the firms in relation to their structural
shocks.
This result also brings us to an interesting observation. When factor models are employed, say
in asset pricing, et is typically treated as the “idiosyncratic risk” of the firms, implying that they
are orthogonal to the factors and each of them affects only its corresponding firm. Given that
the state space is actually represented by et, it may be more appropriate to term them as “firm
structural shocks”.
Equation (3) makes clear another reason why a factor model is useful, besides being represen-
tative of the state. Since the number of factors is typically much smaller than the number of firms,
or r  p, we are able to obtain the r × r inverse (I − βγ−1W )−1 with better numerical accuracy
and computation time, thereby obtaining an efficient (low rank) representation of the dynamics.
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While high-dimension, γ−1 can reasonably to be expected to be sparse and diagonally dominant,
hence does not pose problems with inversion. Without a factor model, identification would have to
be resolved with a full dimension p× p matrix (depending on assumptions).
Note that the observable data in the above setup is Rt, the firm PD changes. The weights W
are chosen by design and lead directly to Ft. The firms’ factor loadings β, dependency on other
firms γ, and standard deviations of their structural shocks D must be estimated from the data.
For firm i, let Rt,i be its PD changes and Rt,−i be the PD changes of other firms which it depends
on. One might be tempted to run a standard OLS of Rt,i on Ft and Rt,−i. However, Equations (3)
and (4) clearly indicate that Ft and Rt,−i are correlated with et, and therefore, any estimation is
subject to endogeneity due to simultaneity.
Indeed, if direct estimation such as OLS is conducted on (1), a contradiction is imposed on
the system by assuming that Ft and Rt,−i are uncorrelated with et, which is clearly violated
here. Furthermore, even if we were to accept the OLS β, identification is no longer possible as
I − βγ−1W = 0. In other words, the identification of the system is entwined with the issue of
simultaneity.
Fortunately, the simultaneity can be resolved by recognising that the simultaneity for firm i
results specifically from its own structural shock et,i. Suppose that for now we know the struc-
tural representations of the factors and firms, A and G respectively. For firm i, the simultaneity
corrections to apply are:








where Ai is the i-th row of A corresponding to factors’ loading on firm i’s structural shock et,i,
Gi,−i contains the elements in the i-th row of G corresponding to the relevant firms’ loading on
firm i’s structural shock et,i, and Gii is the entry of G corresponding to firm i’s loading on its own
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structural shock.
F adjt,i and R
adj
t,−i no longer contain any component of et,i but only the other shocks et,−i. To see
this, simply substitute equations (3) and (4) into the above to eliminate the entries relating to et,i.
Given that et is cross-sectionally independent, it follows that cov(F
adj
t,i , et,i) = 0 and cov(R
adj
t,−i, et,i) =






t,−iγ˜(i) + etD˜i (7)
















The remaining problem is that β, γ, D, A and G are all unknown initially. β, γ and D must be
estimated with knowledge of A and G to apply the simultaneity correction, yet A and G are defined
in terms of β, γ and D. This problem can be resolved numerically via fixed point iteration which
is described in the appendix. The algorithm is efficient owing to the factor model which addresses
the curse of dimensionality (r  p) and multicollinearity / rank deficiency.
2.1 Autoregressive Structure
The above formulation can be easily extended to include an autoregressive structure. The full




Rt−jψj + etD (10)
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where {ψj} are p× p coefficient matrices corresponding to the j-th lags.
Assumption of a factor model essentially applies a low rank structure to the coefficients, or








Ft−jβj + etD (11)
Ft = RtW (12)
where {βj} are r × p coefficient matrices corresponding to the j-th lags. As before, r  p.
The workings above follow through as before, with as many lags as desired. In the case of lag-1
structure used in our application:
Ft = Ft−1β1γ−1W (I − β0γ−1W )−1 + etDγ−1W (I − β0γ−1W )−1
=: Ft−1A1 + etA0 (13)
Rt = Ft−1(A1β0 + β1)γ−1 + et(A0β0 +D)γ−1
=: Ft−1G1 + etG0 (14)
The simultaneity adjustments follow the same logic of eliminating the contemporaneous firm
structural shock:








Likewise, we run the following regression:
Rt,i = F
adj
t,i β˜0,(i) + Ft−1β˜1,(i) +R
adj
t,−iγ˜(i) + etD˜i (17)
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As before, the fixed point algorithm can be used to compute A0, A1, G0, G1, β0, β1, γ and D.
The structural representations (13) and (14) now include autoregressive terms of the factors,









Using the earlier terminology, (21) describes the contemporaneous and lagged feedback effects, and
is useful for assessing the firm’s impact on the system over a forward-looking horizon. For example,
to measure the systemic importance of firm i, one may prescribe shock profiles to et+1,i, et+2,i, ...,
et+T,i such that the firm is shocked to distress, and assess the resulting impact to the system.
What do the firm structural shocks et represent? Conceptually, they are shocks that pertain
specifically to the firm, and keeping it generic allows the model to accommodate a range of causes
in the conditioning event, i.e. the firm may deteriorate due to a number of reasons and there is no
need to restrict the interpretation here. That said, as part of the robustness checks later, we will
analyse them in the context of bailouts and supply chain effects.
We conclude this section with a practical note. While constructed factors are used in this
paper, Assumption 2 does not necessarily require this. One may take a stronger position that the
results also apply to non-constructed or prescribed factors. For example, although our analysis is
conducted on credit risk shocks, we could just as well treat the stock market as a factor. The essence
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of the argument is that defining a particular series as a factor already assigns the identification, as
long as the factor can be represented as a weighted sum of firm PD changes4. However, if all we
want is to assess the impact of the system on the stock market, there is no need to include it as
a factor. We can project the stock market returns on the set of constructed factors and infer its
dynamics from the factors.
3 Application to Systemic Importance
In this section, we discuss the considerations to be made in implementing the factor model iden-
tification framework for identifying global systemically important financial institutions. The focus
here is on banks, which the Basel framework is concerned with, although the study can be extended
to include, say, non-bank insurers5. For each of the 866 listed banks, the impact through 3 global
factors on 21,544 firms is assessed.
3.1 Credit Quality as the Denominator of Systemic Importance
A distinguishing feature of our work is that we use physical default probabilities to analyse contagion
effects. Co-movement of credit quality is the appropriate denominator of systemic importance as it
speaks directly to the health of all firms which make up the economy. As noted earlier, several other
systemic risk measures infer systemic importance from the co-movement of equity (e.g. SRISK) or
equity-based asset returns (e.g. ∆CoVaR, Hautsch et al 2014 and Billio et al 2012). Typically, such
measures are aggregated into a loss value, such as capital shortfall or value-at-risk. In the broader
literature, authors such as Dungey et al (2012) and Diebold and Yilmaz (2011) analyse volatility
spillovers in a network setting.
The trouble for systemic importance is that equity prices and volatilities rise and fall jointly for
numerous reasons, not all of which stem from systemic concerns. Take for example, Google which
4This may require additional assumptions to implement. For example, one may project the stock market onto the
firms via OLS to obtain the implied aggregation. The residual will be orthogonal to the system.
5Banks typically have insurance operations as well.
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holds USD 60 bn in cash, far in excess of its USD 1 bn in debt, or Apple which holds USD 140 bn in
cash and USD 35 bn in debt. Neither company is plausibly expected to default on debt. However,
their equity prices co-move every day, and such movements are obviously not driven by systemic
concerns. Consequently, inferring systemic importance from stock returns bears the inherent risk
of possibly misinterpreting a host of irrelevant factors as systemic importance. This point has also
been noted in Chan-Lau et al (2016).
We opine that co-movements in credit risk is a sharper and more direct means of addressing
systemic importance. The viability of the broad community of firms is the primary concern of
regulators. If an individual firm can cause the joint credit deterioration of a large number of firms
simultaneously, it sparks immediate worry. Analysing credit risk speaks directly to the health of
firms making up the economy.
The use of credit quality is troublesome for most papers for two reasons. Firstly, CDS spreads
contain a premium and do not convey purely credit quality information, due to risk aversion of
the issuer, counterparty risk of the guarantor, trading illiquidity, and other concerns. An example
would be Alter and Beyes (2014) which measures CDS spillovers6. Huang et al (2012) also use
CDS and face the same issues with regards to CDS premium. Secondly, the availability of traded
single-name CDS is extremely limited, and prices are usually illiquid.
We have the benefit of using physical PD computed by the Credit Research Initiative of the
Risk Management Institute, National University of Singapore (RMI-CRI7). The RMI-CRI PD are
estimates of physical default probabilities using a reduced-form econometric approach factoring in
6Additionally, Alter and Beyes (2014) do not address the issue of systemic importance in detail and their analysis
is specific to Europe.
7The RMI-CRI system has implemented the forward intensity model of Duan et al (2012). It currently makes
available and allows free access by all legitimate users to daily updated PD ranging from one month to five years for
60,400 exchange-listed firms in 106 economies around the world. The forward intensity functions used to generate the
RMI-CRI PD are exponential linear functions of some input variables (2 macroeconomic factors and 10 firm-specific
attributes) where the coefficients depend on the forward starting time, and are subject to the Nelson-Siegel type of
smooth term structure restriction. Estimation of the parameters and statistical inference for the constrained system
rely on the pseudo-Bayesian sequential Monte Carlo technique and self-normalized statistics devised in Duan and
Fulop (2013). For details on the specific RMI-CRI implementation, please refer to RMI-CRI Technical Report (2013).
The RMI-CRI model’s parameters are re-calibrated monthly and the inputs to the functions are updated daily.
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many commonly known drivers of default and bankruptcy. Therefore, in contrast to papers which
rely solely on traded CDS, we have less of a credit premium issue. Furthermore, the dataset of
traded single-name CDS is very limited in comparison to RMI-CRI’s PD.
The quality of PD is critical, as we are building an entire model upon it. To allay possible
concerns on reliability, RMI-CRI’s PD have undergone backtesting and have been shown to be
more accurate than competing models. For 1-year PD which we use, accuracy ratios are in excess
of 80% for most countries, even for out-of-sample predictions. To our knowledge, the accuracy is
superior to any other PD datasets which have comparable coverage, and far more accessible. See
Duan et al (2012) and the NUS-RMI CRI Technical Report for details.
3.2 Global Scope for Global SIFIs
It has been noted that several systemic risk measures are developed as some incarnation of correla-
tion analysis, and rely on the conditioning event to infer the individual firm’s systemic importance.
Here, the use of structural analysis bears the advantage of isolating the channels of impact to the
firm-specific level.
Even so, we are not immune to potential misreporting of systemic importance if our dataset
is too small. Consider an extreme example to make the point. If we decided to analyse the 2008
Global Financial Crisis but omitted the key US and European financial institutions, the major
drivers of the systemic risk would have been ignored. A less drastic example, some papers focus
solely on US financial firms without accounting for their impact to and from non-financials, and
discount influences to and from Europe, Asia and the rest of the world. In some sense, we face
the same challenge as Billio et al (2012), which as mentioned uses aggregates of pairwise Granger
Causality of returns to determine systemic risk. A general comment about such implementations is
that they depend entirely on the appropriate selection of variables. Obviously, causal factors that
are not incorporated into the regression model cannot be represented in the output.
National regulators might be predominantly interested in the impact on firms in their own
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jurisdictions. Even so, without taking a global perspective, it is impossible to assess, manage
or otherwise attribute away the external influences which may be affecting domestic firms in a
globalised world.
Our problem is mitigated by using a global dataset, comprising roughly 60,400 firms in 106
economies. When restricted to the scope of data with at least 50% of observations in the period
from Jan 2004 to Dec 2013, and existing balance sheet data as of 31 Dec 2013, there are 21,544 firms
in 96 economies. In terms of raw scope, few efforts have come close to the scale we are contemplating.
Huang et al (2012) analysed 19 bank holding companies covered by the US Supervisory Capital
Assessment Program, while Hautsch et al (2014) focused on publicly traded US financial firms.
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) used CRSP data in conjunction with COMPUSTAT, with the
scope restricted to financial firms. Billio et al (2012) used CRSP data together with the TASS
hedge fund database. The SRISK measure has a global scope but assesses each firm’s systemic
risk in a bivariate setting (each firm individually with the market index), in essence assuming that
externalities between all firms are captured through the single reference market index. CriSIFI,
which uses the same dataset as us, has over 1,200 banks, but excludes non-financials. One drawback
with this data is that private banks are not covered, and hence cannot be measured. However, most
of the large banks are listed, which are the ones we expect to be systemically important.
3.3 Factor Selection
Our analysis of the global dataset is made feasible by the factor model. For reasons which are now
clear given section 2, the choice of factors inherently represents our beliefs with regards to how the
system evolves – by acting as conduits for individual firms to express their impact on all other firms
and itself, and all firms induce their own effects through the factors. To capture these interactions
adqeuately, such externalities of the firm must be expressed through multiple factors, rather than
relying on a single one. Typically, factors are chosen to be representative of the overall state of the
firms, and the factors themselves are often what we are concerned with or consider to be important.
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Setting up the factors with these considerations can be coherent with their importance as a conduit.
Technically, selecting factors amounts to choosing the weights W . Several popular possibilities
include value-weighting, equal-weighting, or even the use of principal components. Consider two
firms, Citibank and National Penn Bancshares, which have total liabilities of USD 1,696,772 mil
and USD 7,293 mil (several magnitudes smaller) respectively. Without knowing more about their
interactions, one may expect the firm with higher liabilities to drive the credit environment to a
greater extent, and this corresponds to the value-weighting case. Likewise, an equal-weighting case
expresses the belief that both the large and small firms drive the factors to a similar extent, apart
from the differing volatility of shocks D. Using the first few Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
factors amounts to believing that firms with higher variation are more important, although one
must note that smaller firms tend to be more volatile8.
It is not true, however, that there is no leeway in determining W . The firm’s loading on
the factors, β, will respond to the choice of W in order to best fit the data, taking into account
simultaneity. If the bad choice of an unrepresentative factor is made, β will instead load on more
relevant factors supposing they are available. Regardless, β is assigned to a factor and does not
make the distinction between firms which are within the same factor. Suppose that in our example
of Citibank and National Penn Bancshares, their default probabilities have a high correlation9 of
0.9, implying that they move closely with one another. Either of them can fulfil the role of creating
variation in the factor. If by design both firms are assigned equal weights and included into the
same factor, they will have similar potential to drive the factor.
The results presented in this paper are based on constructing factors by aggregating individual
firm default probabilities weighted by total liabilities. Since liabilities represent monies owed to
other parties, credit deterioration of a firm with large liabilities is much more likely to devalue the
assets of other firms, and thus cause credit co-movement. Also, liabilities are usually representative
of the size of operations of the firm. In some sense, the value-weighting scheme starts with the
8One alternative around this is to apply value-weighting before factor extraction.
9The actual is closer to 0.4.
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belief of “too-big-to-fail” (W ) and the data reveals “too-interconnected-to-fail” (β).
In the formation of factors, we form each country as a pre-factor via value weighting of its
component firms, then apply hierarchical clustering using Ward’s method to identify correlation
clusters. In essence, countries that co-move more closely will be grouped together. 3 country groups
are obtained via this method, and correspond to Europe, Asia, and the Americas. A number of
developing countries are grouped together with the Americas, reflecting its importance. Even
though this is a purely statistical method, it is interesting to note that countries are grouped up
according to geographical closeness, and supports our intuition that countries located close together
are more likely to co-move. Figure 1 shows the cluster dendrogram leading to the 3 groupings10.
It is possible to cut the dendrogram lower but we do not find it beneficial as there would be many
factors comprised of tiny economies, and unnecessarily adds multicollinearity. For example, if we
cut the dendrogram lower at 1.25, we can have two additional factors “Eastern Europe” branching
out from “Europe”, and “Rest of the World” branching out from “Americas”. However, they have
correlations in the order of 0.6 with other factors11. In addition, both of them are economically too
small or fragmented to be meaningful, with sizes 1/10 or less of the original blocs.
Table 2 summarizes the composition of the 3 factors, while Table 3 provides an analysis of the
R2 captured by the factor model, cross-sectional correlations, and autocorrelations.
These factors are able to capture a fair amount of variation with R2 up to 37.8% (at the 99th
percentile of firms12), which results in lowering of cross-sectional correlations across the spectrum
of firms. There is also marginal improvement in autocorrelation, although they are not high enough
in the first place to warrant explicit modelling of individual terms13.
10Previous versions of this paper further split the country groups into financial and non-financial factors. We found
that this was not necessary due to the high correlation between them.
11Standard variance inflation factors have been avoided as the formal statistics are not readily available for the
coefficients estimated under our model. Nonetheless, if we compute them, adding the two new factors would raise
VIFs from the 1.18-1.54 range to the 1.29-2.21 range.
12More precisely, the factors are fitted to each of the 21,544 firms, resulting in R2 for each of them. The percentiles
refer to the distribution of these.
13If desired, we could model an AR(1) process for each structural shock, but given Equation (21) they would
decay rather quickly. Instead, we have leveraged on the factor model and introduced lagged structural shocks via




























































































































Apart from the baseline factor setup described below, an alternative factor specification of
randomly assigning countries to factors has been explored and the results are robust. Details will
be covered later.
The exclusion of pure exogenous macroeconomic factors is intentional. The purpose of our
analysis alludes to macro-level observations underpinned by microfoundations based on individual
firm data. In fact, the low frequency components of our default probability panel extracted by
filtering have a high correlation with business cycle indicators and GDP. As discussed earlier, one
may wish to infer the impact on GDP by projecting it on the system. It would be inconsistent,
however, to adopt the view that macroeconomic factors drive the world’s credit cycles exogenously.
That said, pure exogenous factors can be easily added via (11) if so desired. Furthermore, if one
wishes to introduce an aggregate economic shock into this model, say monetary or technology shock,
it can be effected by shocking the broad set of relevant firms.
Table 2: List of Country-Sector Factors
Summary statistics of the number and total liabilities of the firms used to construct each factor.




21,544 firms represented by 3 factors
3.4 Conditioning Event and Measurement




Increase in system-wide tail loss given
Financial institution falls into distress
due to its own structural shocks
lagged cross-sectional shocks.
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Table 3: Analysis of Residuals
For each firm, the residuals from the factor model are compared with a model assuming no factors,
and the R2 and lag-1 autocorrelations are reported. Cross-sectional correlations reported here are
drawn from the correlation matrix ignoring the diagonals which by definition is 1. Figures are
reported in %.
Cross-sectional Correlation Lag-1 Autocorrelation
Percentile R2 No Factors Factor Model No Factors Factor Model
99 37.8 25.7 16.1 13.9 13.6
95 24.3 15.4 7.7 8.9 8.5
90 17.9 11.1 5.4 6.9 6.4
75 9.6 6.5 3.0 3.4 2.6
50 3.9 3.4 1.0 -0.7 -1.5
25 1.3 1.0 -0.8 -5.6 -6.1
10 0.4 -0.8 -2.3 -11.1 -11.3
5 0.2 -1.8 -3.3 -14.7 -15.1
1 -1.4 -3.7 -5.2 -22.5 -22.9
This definition is very natural and stems directly from Basel that “The Committee is of the
view that global systemic importance should be measured in terms of the impact that a bank‘s
failure can have on the global financial system and wider economy”. The impact to the system
stems from the financial institution rather than the opposite direction or a confoundment of it.
In other words, we place the firm in the (hypothetical) position of the perpetuator instead of the
victim, and ask what impact it would cause to the global economy of firms.
One must be careful that the impact is measured with respect to other firms in the economy and
not the financial institution which is being conditioned. As noted earlier, several papers interpret
systemic importance of a financial institution as its own potential loss contribution, and thereby
imposes the strong assumption that its own loss somehow translates neatly into its impact on all
other firms in the economy.
We also point out that systemic importance as defined above is a result of a compound event.
First, the financial institution falls into distress due to its own structural shocks, and second, under
such a situation, we are concerned when the entire system is aversely affected. If the distressed
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firm does not cause system-wide problems, the situation is benign and not problematic.
3.4.1 Mathematical Definition
We now proceed to derive our definition in mathematical terms. Standing at time t, PD changes
for the single period t+ k of the system of firms can be found using (14) and (21):








1 G1 + et+kG0 (22)



















et+vHv + et+TG0 (23)
As can be seen from the summations over powers of A1, the interactions in the system are expressed
in low rank through the factors, and implied back to the firms by G1
14.
We need to derive the conditional properties of (23) when a particular firm i is shocked to a












Now, when focusing only on the structural shocks et+k,i due to i, we are essentially shutting down
14Recall that G1 = A1β0 + β1.
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where Hv,i is the i-th row of Hv and likewise G0,i is the i-th row of G0.
Furthermore, taking the conditional linear expectation given a shock to i only requires the i-th
row of Σi which we denote as Σii. Also let µt,i and Σ
i
ii be the mean and variance respectively of
















−1(Ri,distress − µt,i) (26)
where Ri,t+k refers to i’s PD change at time t + k and Ri,distress is the cumulative PD change
required to shock firm i to a distressed state.
We now have the expected cumulative PD changes of the system conditional on firm i being
shocked to distress, but this is not the end as we want to compute additional tail loss induced into
the system conditional on this event. The use of tail loss makes sense because we are predominantly
concerned when extreme events occur. In other words, even if a firm induces higher PD system-
wide, it is not meaningful to assess the impact under situations where actual defaults are minimal.
Let L(Yt) represent the random variable which describes the global total uncovered loss given





Zj ∼ Bernoulli(Yj,t) (28)
where LGDj refers to the loss given default of firm j, and Zj = 1 if firm j defaults with probability




0,i instead of multiplying
the entire matrices. Also, the computation of Aj1s in (23) can be done recursively.
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Yj,t, and Zj = 0 otherwise. It is clear from the equation that L(Yt) is a summation of the losses
given default of all defaulting firms.
Following Duan and Miao (2016), default correlations are incorporated via correlated future
short-term PD. Conditional on correlated future short-term PD paths, actual default events {Zj}
are independent. This approach bears the advantage of enabling default correlations without having
to model joint actual realisations of defaults which is much more challenging.





where Lq(Yt) represents L(Yt) at the q-th percentile.
Si is basically the additional tail loss induced into the system conditional on firm i being shocked
to distress. There is some loose connection here with ∆CoVaR which prescribes systemic risk as the
difference between the system-wide loss conditional on a firm being in distress and under the firm’s
median state. The important distinction is that our conditioning event bears the interpretation of
the firm’s own structural shock rather than an unidentified shock.
In our implementation, we use 1-year forward PD, which is the most commonly referenced term
and apt given that FSB reviews its list of global systemically important banks on an annual basis.
Calibration is done using data with daily frequency. We define the distressed state to be a credit
deterioration shock of 3 standard deviations16 to the 1-year PD over the time horizon of 1 month
or T = 22 days. The tail level for systemic importance is set to q = 99%. Loss given default
assumes a recovery rate of 40%17 on liabilities. Since only the negative impacts to the system are
of interest, firms receiving a decrease in PD (i.e. credit improvement) are zeroed. Firm i’s own
impact is also zeroed since we are interested in the loss to other firms rather than self-impact. All
banks are assessed for systemic importance with the base date t as of 31 Dec 2013.
16The use of a quantile is similar to a number of other measures including ∆CoVaR.
17An alternative is to apply a firesales factor to the assets and assess the uncovered liabilities.
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A direct simulation of Lq(Yt) is extremely taxing and computationally inefficient. Several alter-
natives are possible. Gordy (2002) advocates the use of saddlepoint approximation to accurately
estimate the tail of credit risk profiles, while Duan and Miao (2016) provide an alternative algo-
rithm for a similar problem. We opt to use saddlepoint approximation, and adapt Gordy (2002) to
our setup, the details of which are provided in the appendix.
3.5 Sparse Interactions
In practice, factors will remove most of the commonality but it is not reasonable to expect 3
factors to completely capture the variation in 21,544 firms (see Table 3). In particular, the largest
firms are likely to drive parts of the economy due to the sheer size of their operations and market
importance, and may even operate as their own factors. For each of these extremely large firms,
its corresponding row in γ is allowed to contain sparse entries, meaning that when the said firm
receives a structural shock, it not only impact other firms through the factors, but also directly
through the non-zero entries of γ.
To give context, some of these influential corporate names which may drive their own supply
chains include Walmart, Exxon Mobil, General Electric, and of course, the largest banks which
include ICBC, HSBC, and BNP Paribas to name a few. The top 1% of firms by size are listed in
the appendix.
As there are over 200 large firms, a few assumptions need to be made to make the model
tractable. First, large firms are allowed to drive other firms, but not vice versa. In practice, one
may think of a Walmart distress as causing stress to its suppliers, but a disruption of one of its
many suppliers will not cause a huge problem for Walmart. Second, we assume that large firms do
not directly feed their structural shocks into each other so that it does not introduce an additional
identification subproblem.
Note that Rt = Ftβ0γ
−1 + Ft−1β1γ−1 + etDγ−1. Off-diagonal entries in γ−1 should correspond
to the off-diagonal entries in γ. To see this, the submatrices of γ corresponding to large firms and
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to small firms are both diagonal given our assumptions above. The submatrix corresponding to
large firms’ impact to small firms is non-zero, while the submatrix corresponding to small firms’
impact to large firms is zero. Hence, given the block matrix inversion identity, the locations of the
non-zero entries in γ and γ−1 are the same.
To identify the relevant sparse entries, a few alternatives are available. For a small scale problem,
one may wish to run a variable selection algorithm such as the SCAD (Smoothly Clipped Absolute
Deviation) algorithm provided by Fan and Li (2001) or the MC+ algorithm provided by Zhang
(2010). There is also some relationship with spatial autoregressive models, in that the spatial
weights matrix also introduces cross-dependency between dependent variables. However, we have
21,544 firms with potentially over 200 “explanatory” firms which makes variable selection for all
firms collectively extremely time consuming. We can instead estimate the factor model and then
apply a thresholding estimator to the residual correlation matrix, with the residuals being obtained
via the plug-in method. The thresholding procedure in relation to factor models has been explored
in Fan et al (2011) for observable factors, and extended in Fan et al (2013) for unobservable factors.
Recall that our implementation involves fixed-point iteration, so potentially, some of the non-
zero entries in γ could change at every iteration and cause instability in our fixed-point algorithm.
For practical purposes, the locations of the non-zero entries in γ are pre-identified by running a
standard OLS of firm PD changes against the factors, and then thresholding the residual correlation
matrix. However, the actual values of the non-zero entries in γ are estimated jointly with β with
the necessary simultaneity corrections at every iteration.
A variety of thresholding techniques exist, including the traditionally used hard or soft thresh-
olding. We elect to adopt the SCAD thresholding method, which has been shown to bear the oracle
property, meaning that when the true parameters have some zero components, they are estimated
as 0 with probability tending to 1, and the non-zero components are estimated as well as when
the correct submodel is known. The procedure for SCAD thresholding of the residual correlation
matrix is described in the appendix, and has been used, for example, in Duan and Miao (2016)
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which we largely follow with some adaptation. For theoretical properties pertaining to thresholding
of covariance matrices, we refer readers to Bickel and Levina (2008) and Rothman (2009).
3.6 Data Treatment
As mentioned, we use series with at least 50% of observations in the period from Jan 2004 to Dec
2013, and existing balance sheet data as of 31 Dec 2013. It is necessary to fill missing PD data as
factors need to be formed using all firms. We do so by linear interpolation if the missing segment
is between two points with available data. If data does not exist at the start or end of a particular
time series, it is forward-filled or back-filled respectively. An alternative method to fill data with
fitted values from an underlying model (for example a PCA factor model). In our case, a model has
already been assumed and needs to be estimated with simultaneity adjustments, which does not
lend itself easily to the model-filling method. Another alternative would be to drop even more firms
with missing data. However, this would exclude many of the smaller firms with shorter history.
Even larger firms have missing data from time to time due to, for example, non-trading days.
Since Box-Muller transformations suggest that the 1-year PD of the majority of the firms require
log-transformation, it is applied to all firms. We include a constant in addition to the 3 factors
for completeness18. To reduce the impact of possibly spurious outliers, the log-PD changes are
winsorized at the 1% level.
4 Results
In this section, we present the banks which have been identified as global systemically important19.
The systemic importance measure for the top 30 global systemically important banks are reported
in Table 4. Note that the country column indicates the main factor which the bank feeds its
18That said, the mean of daily log-PD changes is negligible. The average daily mean has a magnitude of 10−4
compared to a much higher standard deviation of 5× 10−2.
19The computation has benefited from the PROPACK package in Matlab, and the stargazer and matchit packages
in R.
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structural shocks into by definition of W . However, through our identification strategy and taking
into account simultaneity, the reality is that each bank feeds its structural shock into all factors
via A0.
All the top banks are convincing candidates by nature of their size, or “too-big-to-fail”, and this
is natural given our identification strategy of prescribing W as value-weighting by total liabilities.
The nature of the restrictions means that small banks do not have the capacity to drive the system
as much as large banks, and would tend to have lower systemic importance. This is evident from
the scatter plot in Figure 2 where there is a general trend that larger banks tend to be more
systemically important. However, the same plot clearly shows that size is not everything, since
systemic importance does not line up perfectly with the size variable. On the contrary, there
exists a number of huge banks with low systemic importance, and mid-sized banks which punch
above their weight. Incorporating the full dynamics of our system, “too-interconnected-to-fail”
plays a very important role. In a later section, we shall relate the systemic importance measure to
firm-specific characteristics.
Overall, the results suggest that two important considerations – “too-big-to-fail” and “too-
interconnected-to-fail” – are incorporated into the model. Size is a precursor which, together with
interconnectedness, determines systemic importance.
5 Validation
This section presents a number of exercises which were conducted to validate the measurement
of systemic importance, as the identification approach appears to be new and its applicability to
systemic importance measurement is untested. First, bailout events from the US correspond with
the model-implied firm structural shocks, more so than with actual PD changes. This suggests that
the model has at least some success in removing the systematic components of PD changes and
identifying the firm structural shocks. Second, we relate sparse entries in the residual correlation
matrix to actual supply chains driven by two different large US firms, and show that SCAD thresh-
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Table 4: Top 30 Global Systemically Important Banks
This table lists the 30 most systemically important banks globally according to our methodology.
The systemic importance measure is the additional tail loss induced into the global system of firms
conditional on the bank being shocked to distress due to its own structural shock. Figures in USD
mil.
# Bank Country Systemic Importance
1 Barclays PLC United Kingdom 45,463
2 Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC United Kingdom 44,193
3 HSBC Holdings PLC United Kingdom 40,790
4 BNP Paribas SA France 39,372
5 Credit Agricole SA France 36,700
6 Deutsche Bank AG Germany 36,219
7 Lloyds Banking Group PLC United Kingdom 32,406
8 Societe Generale SA France 28,953
9 ING Groep NV Netherlands 27,154
10 China Construction Bank Corp China 26,809
11 Banco Santander SA Spain 26,521
12 UniCredit SpA Italy 25,310
13 UBS AG Switzerland 21,970
14 Dexia SA Belgium 20,976
15 Bank of America Corp United States 20,571
16 JPMorgan Chase & Co United States 20,551
17 Credit Suisse Group AG Switzerland 20,359
18 Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc Japan 20,286
19 Citigroup Inc United States 18,578
20 Commerzbank AG Germany 18,159
21 Intesa Sanpaolo SpA Italy 17,836
22 Natixis France 16,835
23 Bank of China Ltd China 16,683
24 Nordea Bank AB Sweden 15,178
25 Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Inc Japan 13,896
26 Wells Fargo & Co United States 13,494
27 Standard Chartered PLC United Kingdom 13,377
28 Danske Bank A/S Denmark 13,042
29 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA Spain 12,527
30 DnB ASA Norway 12,393
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Figure 2: Size Is Not Everything
A scatter plot of systemic importance against total liabilities for each bank. Size, or “too-big-
to-fail” is a precursor to being systemically important by nature of the restrictions and, to-
gether with “too-interconnected-to-fail” revealed by the data, determines systemic importance.
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olding succeeds in discriminating related and unrelated firms. Third, we show that the results are
robust to the choice of factors by investigating an alternative set of factors, formed by randomly
assigning countries to factors. Forth, we show why the selection of “too-big-to-fail” restrictions
(W ) is sensible by comparing it to an unrestricted model which has reverse causality issues. Fifth,
for cross-validation, calibration to the pre-crisis period produces results which are close to the full
sample calibration. Sixth, the predictive power of our model using simultaneity adjusted β is com-
parable to the model using OLS, or at most marginally weaker. Lastly, we make a short comment
on the numerical accuracy of our scheme.
5.1 Relationship between Bailout Events and Firm Structural Shocks
Recall that the firm structural shocks are extracted by removing systematic components, while ac-
counting for the inherent simultaneity. In this section, we assess if the model-implied firm structural
shocks are meaningful by comparing them against bailout events from the US in 2008-2009. It will
be shown that they have a significant relationship, and the relationship is better than the actual
PD changes, suggesting that the model has some success in removing the systematic components
of PD changes and identifying the firm structural shocks.
We focus on the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) and the Targeted Investment Program
(TIP) where the US Treasury’s Office of Financial Stability purchased preferred stock and equity
warrants of individual named banks as part of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The
total commitments under CPP and TIP were USD 205 bn and USD 40 bn respectively, which
together accounted for approximately 3/4 of TARP funds directed towards financial institutions.
The remaining USD 70 bn was directed to AIG which is outside the scope of analysis since, as
mentioned, the focus here is on banks which the Basel framework is concerned with. Other TARP
funds which are not considered here include those directed towards the automotive industry (USD
81 bn) and homeowner foreclosure assistance (USD 39 bn). Also not considered are events of general
liquidity provision and lowering of interest rates as these pertain more to industry-wide systematic
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effects rather than firm-specific events.
The consolidated list of bailouts was sourced from ProPublica, which contains 709 named banks
which received aid under CPP, and 2 named banks under TIP. For each bank, the amount of capital
committed and date entered are available. Of the 278 listed US banks in our system, we were able
to identify 181 bailed out banks. With Bank of America and Citigroup appearing in both CPP and
TIP, we have 183 observations.
The strategy here involves matching each bank which received aid to similar banks elsewhere
which did not receive aid, and checking if the bailout produced a significant negative effect on PD
level. A negative relation is only natural since more capital becomes available to meet liabilities,
thereby directly improving the credit quality of the bank. In technical terms, distance to default
increases and this is imputed as a negative effect into the PD.
The control group was formed from banks worldwide, but it was necessary to exclude20 EU
countries (including UK), US and Canada as there was a wave of bailouts in Oct 2008 led by the
UK and followed by many European countries and the US. There were also reports of Canadian
banks receiving secret bailouts21. These events might have confounded our results. In practice,
this means that Japanese, BRICS, Middle-Eastern and other Asian banks were matched to the
US banks. Although not ideal, the expected bias would be against our results as the banks in
these countries were less affected by the sub-prime crisis and presumably had less of an upward
PD trajectory, and we are looking for a negative coefficient on the bailout banks relative to these
banks. The pool of daily observations from 28 Oct 2008 to 23 Oct 2009 corresponding to the first
and last bailout dates was used.
For the purpose of matching, we apply nearest neighbour matching based on Mahalanobis
distance along the dimensions of total liabilities (size), PD (likelihood of default) and 3-month firm
20The alternative would have been to include all bailouts in the world, including EU and Canada, but an open and
comprehensive list was not readily available. The major European bank bailouts can be found easily, but there is a
lack of detailed data on smaller individual bank bailouts.
21For example, see “The Big Banks’ Big Secret: Estimating government support for Canadian banks during the
financial crisis” published by Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.
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PD trend (severity of short-term deterioration), reflecting what we think are motivations for the
government to bailout a bank. Mahalanobis distance produced better balance of the covariates
compared to logit propensity score. That said, the conclusions survive in both cases. We pick a
matching ratio of 5 control units to 1 treatment unit to increase the power of the test. Figure 3
shows good balance between the treatment and control samples in the form of QQ plots of the
covariates.
The results provided in Table 5 show that bailout events do not have a significant relationship
with raw changes in firm PD. However, when our model removes the systematic components and
extracts the firm-specific component, the relationship becomes significant, and the coefficient is
negative as expected. The conclusion here supports the use of firm structural shocks, et, produced
by our model. The results reported are based on [−1, 1] changes but are also valid for day-0 changes
or [-2,2]. Both the firm structural shocks and the PD changes have been standardised according to
their volatilities.
5.2 Analysis of Sparsity in γ
We had allowed for sparse entries in γ on the pretext that large pivotal firms may drive parts of
the economy, over and above the factors channel. Using two separate examples of large US firms,
Walmart and Ford Motor, we show that this is not merely a theoretical exercise but could reflect
the actual supply chain relationships which each of these large firms may have with the wider
community.
For this exercise, we use COMPUSTAT Segments Data which provides customer data for over
70% of the companies in the US database. We use Walmart because it has the most extensive
supply chain in this dataset. After matching with our PD database, we have 101 related firms
which report Walmart as an important customer. The intuition underlying our approach is that if
Walmart’s credit quality deteriorates, it could affect its ability to make payments to its creditors, in
this case those who have reported Walmart as an important customer, and consequently, spillover
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Figure 3: Balance Analysis of Matched Sample
QQ plots of treated and control groups, pre- and post- matching, using nearest neighbour matching
based on Mahalanobis distance along the dimensions of total liabilities (size), PD (likelihood of
default) and 3-month firm PD trend (severity of short-term deterioration).
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Table 5: Relation between Bailouts and Firm Structural Shocks
The objective of this table is to show the relationship between bailouts and our model-implied
firm structural shocks et. Regressions were based on a sample of 183 US bank bailout events
matched with 915 control banks. ∆ln(PD)t refers to the actual change in firm PD, while et refers
to the model-implied firm structural shock extracted from ∆ln(PD)t by removing the systematic
components using our algorithm which accounts for simultaneity.
Dependent variable
∆ln(PD)t et ∆ln(PD)t et
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bailout=1 0.082 −0.439∗∗ 0.074 −0.445∗∗







Constant 0.418∗∗∗ 0.660∗∗∗ 3.601∗∗∗ 2.478∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.091) (0.641) (0.630)
Observations 1,098 1,098 1,098 1,098
R2 0.0001 0.004 0.032 0.012
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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the credit impact to them. Likewise, we also analyse Ford Motor which is the second most reported
customer with 32 related firms after matching. There is a limit as to how many large firms we
can study because customers are reported in text format without unique identifiers. Furthermore,
many of the top firms in terms of size are domiciled outside of the US.
For each of the said related firms, we match it with control firms which do not report Walmart
(or Ford Motor as the case may be) as an important customer, are also domiciled in the US, in the
same industrial sector, and close in size. We use a match ratio of up to 5 firms (this can be relaxed),
provided that the respective subsets have the number. Then, we check if the firms identified using
the SCAD thresholding procedure is indicative of having an actual relationship.
As presented in Table 6, the SCAD thresholding procedure demonstrated effectiveness in dis-
criminating between firms reporting Walmart (or Ford Motor) as a key customer and unrelated
firms, even though it was implemented in a purely statistical sense without knowledge of the actual
supply chain. We note that the COMPUSTAT data is based on companies’ self-reporting and are
truncated below a certain level of activity. However, under-reporting in this case would bias against
our results, but we still find significant relationships.








Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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5.3 Alternative Selection of Factors
One might think that our results are largely driven by the selection of factors. As it turns out,
the results are generally similar if we change the factor specification, provided that the notion of
“too-big-to-fail” is preserved. In other words, as long as we recognise that larger firms have more
capacity to drive the system, there is some flexibility as to which countries we group together, and
how we compose the factors from firms. We speculate that there are two reasons for this. First, we
allow interconnectedness to not only be expressed through the factors, but also through the sparse
entries in γ, and this affords some flexibility. Second, there is inherent positive correlation between
countries, so assigning a particular country to another factor does not completely alter the setup,
compared to a scenario where all countries are uncorrelated.
In the alternative specification, instead of using correlation clusters and obtaining the 3 country
groups, we randomly assign each country to 1 of 3 similarly sized groups, each representing a factor.
As before, each firm is value-weighted by the size of its liabilities when composing the factors.
The computed systemic importance numbers are extremely close to the baseline case, and the
correlation between the alternative and the baseline is 86.4%, supporting the conclusion that our
results are robust to the choice of factors selected. The scatter plot is provided in Figure 4.
5.4 Comparison with Unrestricted Model
Our specification of W prescribes the channels through which firms are allowed to express their
impact on the system, and it was mentioned that they are essentially “too-big-to-fail” restrictions,
where bigger banks have more capacity to affect the system. As shown, the data reveals “too-
interconnected-to-fail” and both considerations together determine the systemic importance of the
financial firm, and there instances of huge but not systemically important banks.
Without these restrictions, the direction of structural causality would be unclear and there
would be numerous instances of reverse causality. To illustrate their importance, consider the case
of a pure correlation model. Figure 5 shows that many small banks would be wrongly assigned a
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Figure 4: Alternative Factor Specification – Random Assignment to Factors
This scatter plot compares the systemic importance computed using factors obtained via random
assignment to 3 similarly sized country factors as an alternative specification, to the baseline case.
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high systemic importance by a pure correlation model, implying that they have the same capacity as
banks which are several magnitudes larger in size to perpetuate a crisis. The more likely situation
is that these small banks are highly dependent of the rest of the firms, and the high “systemic
importance” number simply indicates that they are severely affected when the economy is doing
poorly, rather than them perpetuating a crisis. To push the point, small banks default from time
to time, and we do not see systemic events. Clearly, a pure correlation model is inappropriate for
imposing regulatory risk charges.
Figure 5: Unrestricted / Pure Correlation Model - Systemic Importance and Size
The unrestricted model fails to rule out reverse causality and wrongly assigns high systemic im-
portance to small banks, implying that they have the same capacity as banks which are several
magnitudes larger in size to perpetuate a crisis.
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5.5 Cross-Validation
Our model is able to learn from the relationships between the factors and firms even when the
calibration is restricted to the pre-crisis period. Figure 6 shows that systemic importance measured
using the reduced pre-crisis sample correlates closely with that using the full sample. The full period,
as stated before, is from Jan 2004 to Dec 2013, while the reduced sample uses the period Jan 2004
to Feb 2008, right before the collapse of Bear Stearns and prior to the spikes in default probabilities.
The correlation between the systemic importance values of the reduced and full samples is 82.0%,
suggesting that the parameters are relatively stable.
Figure 6: Cross-Validation
This scatter plot compares the systemic importance using the parameters calibrated to the
pre-crisis period from Jan 2004 to Feb 2008, to that of the full sample from Jan 2004 to Dec 2013.
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5.6 Predictive Power of Model using Simultaneity Adjusted β
Given a sensible W , our model must be able to predict PD changes of the system well, and this
forms another prong of the validation. By prediction, we mean that given the right-hand side actual
changes in factors, the left-hand-side expected firm PD changes are a good indication of the actual
firm PD changes. Essentially, we are validating (11).
1-year PD changes of the 3 factors are used to predict the PD changes of 21,544 firms over the
same period, and checked against the actual PD changes. Both Bear Stearns and Lehman collapsed
in 2008, which makes the 1-year PD changes of 2008 a suitable candidate for the check. Using the
simultaneity adjusted β provides a cross-sectional R2 of 20.4%. This is only moderate degradation
from using OLS which gives 25.6%.
5.7 Numerical Accuracy
We make a short comment on taking the inverse (I − β0γ−1W )−1 in Equation (13). Recall that in
the OLS case, β0γ
−1W = I which prevents the identification. Although the simultaneity adjusted
β is quite close to the OLS β, it does not appear that numerical accuracy is compromised. The
condition number of (I − β0γ−1W ) at the final iteration is 2.27 = 100.356, indicating minimal loss
of precision. Also, instead of evaluating the standalone inverse, we solve for W (I − β0γ−1W )−1.
6 Other Studies
6.1 Relating Systemic Importance to Firm Characteristics
One may ask, other than size, what is systemic importance related to in the cross-section? For
example, in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), the authors related ∆CoVaR to firm characteristics
in order to model forward-looking ∆CoVaR. We reference the variables used in their study but
augment it with additional variables which may be more relevant or insightful.
The first characteristic which they use is leverage based on book values. For our study, we use
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book leverage but also include market leverage which is computed from implied market value of
assets22 and market value of equity. The second characteristic is maturity mismatch which they
define as the difference between short-term debt and cash, divided by total liabilities. There is a
problem with this definition for financial firms, because the largest source of liabilities for a bank is
usually deposits which do not fall under short-term debt. We instead use the ratio of market value
of assets to adjusted liabilities, which we term as asset adequacy. Adjusted liabilities essentially
refer to the combination of short-term liabilities, half of long-term liabilities, and an appropriate
fraction of other liabilities (deposits), and commonly referred to as the default point in credit
analysis. This ratio better reflects the adequacy of a bank’s assets to meet its obligations. Since
it is readily available, we also include the volatility of assets. The third variable is market-to-book
ratio which we also use. The fourth is size, measured as the book value of equity. In our context,
size restrictions have been imposed using total liabilities, since they represent obligations to other
parties and would impact them in the event of a default occur. The fifth and sixth are equity return
volatility and equity market beta. We have already laid out the advantages of working with credit
risk rather than equity risk. In the context of our model, we use the sum of non-zero coefficients in
G0, which captures the joint effects of factor sensitivity and volatility. As many of these variables
seem to be alluding to the ability of the bank to meet its obligations, we also use distance-to-default
(DTD) in one of the specifications.
As established before and shown in the first regression of Table 7, systemic importance is
closely related to size. If we remove the size effect, the remaining variation is related to the ability
of the bank to meet its obligations, as shown in the second regression. More assets relative to
liabilities, and lower asset volatility reduce systemic importance. Market leverage, rather than
book leverage, is mildly significant. In the third regression, DTD stands out as the most relevant
firm characteristic. One possible interpretation is that banks closer to default are more likely to
affect other firms and hence more systemically important. In other words, firms respond less to the
22This is computed as part of the PD estimation procedure and accounts for the deposit-taking activities of banks.
For details on market value of assets and adjusted liabilities, please refer to Duan and Wang (2012).
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deterioration of a bank which is far from default. The weaker effects in the 2nd stage regression
may be due to size being correlated with other firm characteristics listed. For example, size in some
sense also captures the number of counterparties and extent of operations.
6.2 Mimicking FSB’s list of G-SIBs
One question that can be asked is how well our results line up with FSB’s list of G-SIBs which uses
Basel’s methodology. Banks considered to be of global systemic importance are classified into tiers
ranging from 1 to 5. Depending on the tier, higher loss absorbency requirements of between 1.0%
and 3.5% will apply, with the higher tiers attracting more stringent requirements. Briefly, Basel
prescribes an indicator-based approach which combines 5 indicators – cross-jurisdictional activity,
size, interconnectedness, substitutability, and complexity. A summary extracted from the Basel
document is presented in Figure 7.
However, upon closer inspection, it turns out that almost all of the indicators are essentially
size measures, be it assets or liabilities. Even the interconnectedness indicator is in fact a size
measure, granted it is a subset. It is not surprising therefore, that the list of G-SIBs by FSB is
the list of biggest banks by size, other than a few exceptions. It certainly incorporates the notion
of “too-big-to-fail”. The exception is substitutability which seems to be less related to size. Our
model does not incorporate this indicator, but nothing stops us from adjusting our final measure
with this consideration.
What might improve the measure is to actually assess how the bank would impact its external
environment, i.e. others firms, instead of relying solely on the bank’s own size to proxy all indicators.
Here, our measure has the advantage of incorporating “too-interconnected-to-fail” by measuring
β0, G0 and G1.
In any case, to illustrate, we try to mimic FSB’s list in our framework, making only a few
simple adjustments in the process. The intention is to show that FSB’s list is first and foremost a
size measure, and a matter of amplifying the impact of certain countries while downplaying other
47
Table 7: Systemic Importance and Firm Characteristics
Dependent variable:


















Constant 1,025.688∗∗∗ −387.703 −794.317
(77.849) (794.421) (516.729)
Observations 843 843 843
R2 0.792 0.042 0.034
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 7: Basel’s Indicator-Based Approach
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countries. The adjustments are as follows. First, instead of having 3 country factors, we have
a single world factor, through which all interactions take place. This limits interconnectedness
as there is now only one channel. As before, we use value-weighting but now set to zero the
weights of countries whose banks are not in the G-SIB list. For example, Russian, Indian, and
even Canadian banks are excluded from forming the factor. Next, we emphasize certain countries
over others by artificially inflating or deflating the systemic importance measure. US banks are
adjusted upwards to 120%, while the European countries, UK, France, Germany, and Switzerland
are adjusted upwards to 200%, 150%, 180%, and 200% respectively. This means that the Asian
countries, such as Japan and China, are left unadjusted. Some of these adjustments might simply
reflect the varying degrees to which Basel has been implemented in these countries, with some
taking leadership and others playing it slow, or perhaps the difference in political impetus to
embrace post-crisis developments.
Figure 8 shows the relationship between our adjusted systemic importance rankings and the
tier assigned by FSB. Each point in the figure represents a bank. A more systemically important
bank should presumably be assigned to a higher FSB tier, and a higher rank (lower number, i.e.
rank 1 is highest). The figure demonstrates this relationship correctly, meaning that our method
with the above adjustments to limit interconnectedness and emphasize certain countries over others
can reproduce FSB’s list approximately. Without the said adjustments, the spread is wider and it
becomes harder to distinguish between the FSB tiers.
The exercise is just to demonstrate the point; with enough fine tuning, it should be possible to
obtain a closer and more exact list.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we measured systemic importance of a financial institution as the additional tail loss
induced into the system when the financial institution falls into distress due to its own structural
shocks. Using only public data, we modelled over 21,000 firms listed globally jointly as a system,
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Figure 8: Systemic Importance Ranking vs FSB Tier
Comparison of systemic importance ranking, using our methodology with adjustments to limit
interconnectedness, amplify the effects of certain countries, and downplay others, and the actual
tier which FSB assigns these banks to. A higher tier is associated with a higher rank (lower number).
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while relying on “too-big-to-fail” restrictions to provide structural identification. Together with
“too-interconnected-to-fail”, the two key considerations of systemic importance are incorporated.
Using data from the CPP and TIP under TARP, we found that bailout events were more
closely related to the firm structural shocks which we extracted, than to actual raw PD changes,
suggesting that our model has some success in removing the systematic components of PD changes
and identifying firm structural shocks. We also analysed firms that reported Walmart as a major
customer, and found that the SCAD thresholding which we applied was effective in discriminating
between firms that rely on Walmart and firms that do not, supporting our use of the sparse matrix.
A similar finding was obtained for Ford Motor. Additional validation checks, including random
selection of factors, and cross-validation using the pre-crisis sample, provided favourable results. In
addition, we showed that Basel’s list of global systemically important banks can be interpreted in
our framework as limiting interconnectedness and inflating the impact of US and European banks,
while reducing the impact of Asian banks.
Overall, our approach to measuring systemic importance bears the advantages of exploiting
structural analysis to attribute systemic importance to individual banks, and while using only
public PD data, can be corroborated with actual firm level events.
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Appendix A: Fixed Point Iteration to Resolve Simultaneity Bias











For our implementation, we choose the initial values to correspond to the case where β =
0.9βOLS and γ = I.
2. For iteration m = 1, 2, 3, ... until convergence:
(a) Compute Am0 and G
m
0 according to (13) and (14).
(b) For each firm:
i. Compute the adjusted factors F adj,mt,i and R
adj,m
t,−i according to (15) and (16).
ii. Run the regression (17) for each firm and obtain the estimates for βnew(i) and γ
new
(i)
via (18) to (20).
(c) Set the βm(i) = dβ
new
(i) + (1− d)βm−1(i) and γm(i) = dγnew(i) + (1− d)γm−1(i) .
(d) Perform SCAD thresholding on γm.
d is a weight to reduce oscillation of the solution, which is set to 0.5 for our implementation. For
regularity, β0 and β1 are constrained to be within ±1 of the OLS regression, and off-diagonal entries
of γ are not allowed to be collectively greater than 0.5 in magnitude. Other than F adj,mt,i and R
adj,m
t,−i ,
the RHS variables of the regression consist of lagged factors Ft−1 which are not simultaneous with
the contemporaneous shock and the inverse (F Tt−1Ft−1)−1 can be computed once and stored for use
at every iteration. Although we are unable to show theoretically that convergence is guaranteed,
it has been possible to obtain convergence empirically for different factors and subsamples.
Appendix B: Computation of Tail Loss
Our methodology calls for the computation of tail percentile for the global total uncovered loss. To
recall, we need to compute Lq(Yt), the q-th percentile for the loss of the system in (27). We apply a
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saddlepoint approximation very similar to Gordy (2002). First, note that the cumulant generating


















Let vˆ denote the solution to L(Yt) = K ′(vˆ). Using the Lugannani-Rice approximation, the
formula for the tail of L(Yt) is:












and Φ and φ denote the cdf and pdf of the standard normal distribution respectively.
For the purpose of this paper, we search for L(Yt) corresponding to q = 0.99. The lower limit of
the domain which we need to search in is vˆ = 0 corresponding to E(L(Yt)). To determine the upper
limit, note that the maximum value for K ′(vˆ) is the case where every firm defaults, or
∑
i LGDi.


















23As per Gordy (2002), this is a close approximation to the CGF rather than the exact form.
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Appendix C: Top 1% of Firms by Total Liabilities
Table 8: Top 1% of Firms by Total Liabilities
# Firm Name Total Liabilities (USD bn)
1 Industrial & Commercial Bank of China Ltd 2860
2 HSBC Holdings PLC 2536
3 BNP Paribas SA 2381
4 Deutsche Bank AG 2340
5 Credit Agricole SA 2331
6 Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc 2325
7 China Construction Bank Corp 2278
8 JPMorgan Chase & Co 2257
9 Barclays PLC 2177
10 Bank of China Ltd 2075
11 Bank of America Corp 1894
12 Mizuho Financial Group Inc 1776
13 Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC 1716
14 Citigroup Inc 1697
15 Societe Generale SA 1621
16 Banco Santander SA 1501
17 ING Groep NV 1454
18 Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Inc 1432
19 Lloyds Banking Group PLC 1341
20 Wells Fargo & Co 1319
21 UniCredit SpA 1106
22 UBS AG 1105
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Table 8: Top 1% of Firms by Total Liabilities
# Firm Name Total Liabilities (USD bn)
23 Credit Suisse Group AG 935
24 Allianz SE 883
25 Bank of Communications Co Ltd 875
26 Goldman Sachs Group Inc/The 845
27 Nordea Bank AB 807
28 Intesa Sanpaolo SpA 797
29 Toronto-Dominion Bank/The 777
30 Royal Bank of Canada 777
31 Commerzbank AG 766
32 Morgan Stanley 764
33 MetLife Inc 761
34 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA 757
35 National Australia Bank Ltd 710
36 Natixis 696
37 Prudential Financial Inc 688
38 Bank of Nova Scotia 668
39 Commonwealth Bank of Australia 649
40 Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd 613
41 Westpac Banking Corp 605
42 Standard Chartered PLC 605
43 China Merchants Bank Co Ltd 593
44 Assicurazioni Generali SpA 580
45 Danske Bank A/S 567
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Table 8: Top 1% of Firms by Total Liabilities
# Firm Name Total Liabilities (USD bn)
46 Industrial Bank Co Ltd 562
47 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 555
48 Banco do Brasil SA 537
49 General Electric Co 532
50 Schweizerische Nationalbank 524
51 China Citic Bank Corp Ltd 519
52 China Minsheng Banking Corp Ltd 509
53 Ping An Insurance Group Co of China Ltd 492
54 Bank of Montreal 485
55 Prudential PLC 481
56 Sberbank of Russia 460
57 Manulife Financial Corp 457
58 CNP Assurances 448
59 Aegon NV 445
60 American International Group Inc 441
61 CaixaBank SA 430
62 Resona Holdings Inc 418
63 Itau Unibanco Holding SA 409
64 Nomura Holdings Inc 403
65 Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Holdings Inc 389
66 DnB ASA 382
67 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 382
68 Banco Bradesco SA 378
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Table 8: Top 1% of Firms by Total Liabilities
# Firm Name Total Liabilities (USD bn)
69 Zurich Insurance Group AG 377
70 Svenska Handelsbanken AB 375
71 Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce/Canada 364
72 State Bank of India 338
73 Deutsche Boerse AG 337
74 Bank of New York Mellon Corp/The 334
75 US Bancorp/MN 319
76 KBC Groep NV 319
77 Volkswagen AG 318
78 Dexia SA 317
79 Shinkin Central Bank 314
80 Muenchener Rueckversicherungs AG 311
81 Power Corp of Canada 293
82 Power Financial Corp 292
83 CIC 291
84 DBS Group Holdings Ltd 290
85 Ping An Bank Co Ltd 288
86 Woori Finance Holdings Co Ltd 288
87 Great-West Lifeco Inc 284
88 China Life Insurance Co Ltd 281
89 Electricite de France 280
90 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA 271
91 Swedbank AB 269
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Table 8: Top 1% of Firms by Total Liabilities
# Firm Name Total Liabilities (USD bn)
92 Shinhan Financial Group Co Ltd 268
93 PNC Financial Services Group Inc/The 266
94 Hartford Financial Services Group Inc/The 265
95 Erste Group Bank AG 260
96 Hana Financial Group Inc 257
97 Capital One Financial Corp 248
98 Toyota Motor Corp 247
99 Berkshire Hathaway Inc 247
100 Huaxia Bank Co Ltd 240
101 VTB Bank OJSC 234
102 Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp Ltd 234
103 London Stock Exchange Group PLC 224
104 Lincoln National Corp 217
105 Deutsche Postbank AG 216
106 BOC Hong Kong Holdings Ltd 216
107 Banco de Sabadell SA 215
108 Old Mutual PLC 207
109 United Overseas Bank Ltd 197
110 State Street Corp 197
111 Banco Popular Espanol SA 194
112 Principal Financial Group Inc 192
113 Cathay Financial Holding Co Ltd 191
114 AT&T Inc 188
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Table 8: Top 1% of Firms by Total Liabilities
# Firm Name Total Liabilities (USD bn)
115 Petroleo Brasileiro SA 187
116 BlackRock Inc 187
117 Verizon Communications Inc 186
118 PetroChina Co Ltd 186
119 Industrial Bank of Korea 185
120 Swiss Re AG 185
121 Bank of Beijing Co Ltd 185
122 Ford Motor Co 182
123 BP PLC 180
124 Daiwa Securities Group Inc 178
125 Royal Dutch Shell PLC 174
126 Exxon Mobil Corp 172
127 National Bank of Canada 172
128 Sun Life Financial Inc 171
129 Daimler AG 169
130 GDF Suez 167
131 Swiss Life Holding AG 166
132 Tokio Marine Holdings Inc 165
133 Bank of Ireland 165
134 Banco Popolare SC 163
135 Raiffeisen Bank International AG 163
136 Banco Santander Brasil SA/Brazil 161
137 Enel SpA 159
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Table 8: Top 1% of Firms by Total Liabilities
# Firm Name Total Liabilities (USD bn)
138 BB&T Corp 159
139 Generali Deutschland Holding AG 159
140 Standard Bank Group Ltd 157
141 SLM Corp 156
142 Unione di Banche Italiane SCPA 154
143 Malayan Banking Bhd 152
144 SunTrust Banks Inc 151
145 MS&AD Insurance Group Holdings 144
146 Allied Irish Banks PLC 143
147 National Bank of Greece SA 141
148 Bayerische Motoren Werke AG 139
149 Softbank Corp 133
150 Macquarie Group Ltd 132
151 Wal-Mart Stores Inc 131
152 Ameriprise Financial Inc 131
153 American Express Co 131
154 T&D Holdings Inc 131
155 Tokyo Electric Power Co Inc 130
156 Total SA 130
157 Charles Schwab Corp/The 130
158 Hang Seng Bank Ltd 130
159 Fukuoka Financial Group Inc 129
160 Telefonica SA 127
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Table 8: Top 1% of Firms by Total Liabilities
# Firm Name Total Liabilities (USD bn)
161 E.ON SE 126
162 Sony Corp 125
163 Bank of Yokohama Ltd/The 124
164 Rosneft OAO 124
165 China Petroleum & Chemical Corp 118
166 Ageas 116
167 Piraeus Bank SA 113
168 Banco Espanol de Credito SA 113
169 Deutsche Telekom AG 113
170 Airbus Group NV 111
171 Fifth Third Bancorp 111
172 Gazprom OAO 109
173 Chiba Bank Ltd/The 108
174 Banco Comercial Portugues SA 108
175 Hokuhoku Financial Group Inc 107
176 AMP Ltd 107
177 Comcast Corp 106
178 Aflac Inc 105
179 ENI SpA 105
180 China Pacific Insurance Group Co Ltd 104
181 CIMB Group Holdings Bhd 104
182 Espirito Santo Financial Group SA 103
183 Turkiye Is Bankasi 103
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Table 8: Top 1% of Firms by Total Liabilities
# Firm Name Total Liabilities (USD bn)
184 Fiat SpA 103
185 Unipol Gruppo Finanziario SpA 102
186 Chevron Corp 102
187 Allstate Corp/The 102
188 Shizuoka Bank Ltd/The 101
189 Regions Financial Corp 101
190 Eurobank Ergasias SA 101
191 Mitsubishi Corp 100
192 Vodafone Group PLC 99
193 Siemens AG 99
194 Banco Espirito Santo SA 98
195 Bank Hapoalim BM 98
196 International Business Machines Corp 98
197 Wuestenrot & Wuerttembergische AG 98
198 Bank of Baroda 97
199 Bank Leumi Le-Israel BM 96
200 RWE AG 96
201 Korea Electric Power Corp 95
202 Mediobanca SpA 95
203 Hanwha Corp 94
204 Turkiye Garanti Bankasi AS 93
205 Genworth Financial Inc 92
206 Nissan Motor Co Ltd 91
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Table 8: Top 1% of Firms by Total Liabilities
# Firm Name Total Liabilities (USD bn)
207 Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Corp 91
208 Honda Motor Co Ltd 90
209 Yamaguchi Financial Group Inc 90
210 Taishin Financial Holding Co Ltd 89
211 Alpha Bank AE 89
212 Mega Financial Holding Co Ltd 88
213 Northern Trust Corp 88
214 American Capital Agency Corp 87
215 China Railway Group Ltd 87
Appendix D: Identifying Sparse Relationships
As discussed, to identify the non-zero entries in γ, we first run a standard OLS and inspect the
residual correlation matrix ρ.
1. On row-by-row basis:
(a) If the firm corresponding to the row is not in the top 1%, off-diagonal entries in γ are
zero.
(b) If the firm corresponding to the row is in the top 1%, off-diagonal entries in γ will be
those that are non-zero after the following:
i. Perform significance filtering on each pairwise entry in the row of ρ and set insignif-
icant entries to zero at the two-tailed 5% level.
ii. Apply SCAD thresholding to the remaining off-diagonal entries.
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The SCAD thresholding operator, as defined in Fan et al (2001), is:
T (ρij) =

sgn(ρij)(|ρij | − λ)+, if |ρij | ≤ 2λ
{(a− 1)ρij − sgn(ρij)aλ}/(a− 2), if 2λ < |ρij | ≤ aλ
ρij , if |ρij | > aλ
The parameters used for SCAD thresholding in our implementation are based on cross-validation.
Given the large size of the system, the λ parameter is cross-validated using a sub-sample of 5,000
random firms and equals 0.09 for the baseline case. a = 3.7 as per standard practice. As per Fan et
al (2013), λ is selected so as to ensure that the resulting correlation matrix is positive semidefinite.
Assumptions applied for SCAD thresholding can be found in Fan et al (2011), and include (1)
sparsity of the covariance matrix of {ut} := etDγ−1, (2) {ut} stationary and ergodic, (3) deviations
of estimated errors from actual errors are bounded.
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